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Résumé  
Ce papier présente une méthodologie et un environnent
outillé pour la conception et l’analyse de sureté de systèmes 
automobiles critiques selon une approche d’ingénierie 
dirigée par les modèles. Cette méthodologie adresse 
quelques limitations identifiées dans les méthodes et outils
existants pour l’analyse de sûreté fonctionnelle. La 
méthodologie exploite la co-ingénierie matériel et de sureté 
pour définir une méthode de développement
compositionnelle compatible avec la norme ISO26262. La 
méthodologie permet de définir des systèmes sur par
conception en couplant les processus de sûreté et de 
développement. La méthodologie est implémentée dans un 
outil de modélisation appelé Sophia, offrant un 
environnement de développement graphique pour la 
conception et l’implémentation de systèmes matériels.
Summary 
The paper gives an overview of existing methods and tools 
for safety analysis and presents a methodology and 
framework for design and safety analysis of critical 
automotive systems based on model-based approach. It 
exploits hardware/safety co-engineering to define a 
compositional development method compatible with 
ISO26262. The methodology allows obtaining safe-by-
design automotive systems by coupling development and 
safety processes. The methodology is implemented in a 
modeling framework, called Sophia, offering a graphical 
development environment for hardware system design and 
implementation. 
1. Introduction
In automotive domain with the advent of automated driving, 
systems are safety-critical as failures or hazardous 
decisions about the environment may lead to accidents that 
cause human lives. Due to the safety-criticality nature of
such systems, system and safety engineers are prone to 
follow safety standards and guidelines (e.g. ISO26262). The 
increased complexity of systems, and their new constraints, 
imposes to R&D teams, of different industries, to adopt new 
methodologies and their associated tools. 
In this context, model-based engineering is a promising 
approach capable to integrate various methods and tools
for safety analysis into the single system modeling 
environment, to customize this environment to the 
automotive domain and to provide elaborated traceability 
links across safety analysis process. In practice, however, 
the tool support of model-based safety analysis (MBSA) and
traceability of safety data across this process is not well-
elaborated. 
To cope with this issue, we propose a methodology and a 
framework, called Sophia, to couple MBSE and MBSA for 
automotive systems. The methodology extends our prior 
work described in [1][2] to the context of automotive
systems and complies with ISO26262 safety standard.  
The associate Sophia framework automates the proposed 
methodology and improves the traceability of system and 
safety data during MBSE and MBSA of automotive systems 
at the early phases of their life-cycle. Sophia is based on 
Papyrus 1 UML modeler. It includes safety meta-models 
and profiles compatible with ISO26262, model 
transformation and fault tree generation plug-ins, tools for 
HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment), FMEA 
(Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree
1 https://www.eclipse.org/papyrus/ 
2 https://www.fides-reliability.org/ 
Analysis), basic integration with FIDES 2 tool, document 
generation plug-ins.  
We apply the methodology on an Adaptive Cruise Control 
(ACC) system to illustrate its applicability and effectiveness 
to support system and safety co-engineering with regard to 
ISO26262. Using this case study, we apply the proposed 
method and show how to use Sophia environment to 
describe possible effects of failures of ACC and to display 
various results including FME(C)A tables, generated fault 
trees, etc. 
2. Related Works
According to [3], MBSA is “an approach in which the system 
and safety engineers share a common system model 
created using a model-driven development process”. The 
integration of any classical safety analysis method into 
MBSE environment requires three main steps [2]: 
• System model creation;
• Safety annotation and modeling;
• Safety analysis and generation of results.
The system model can be created using languages such as 
UML (Unified Modeling Language) 3 , SysML (System 
Modeling Language) 4, or domain specific languages like 
RobotML which extends UML to describe architectures and 
behaviors of mobile robots. Then the system model is 
extended with the safety concepts and relations. This could 
be done either by using safety profiles [2][4][5][6] or by 
translating the system model into formal or safety 
languages for further analysis [7][8]. The latter case needs 
additional efforts to study the semantics of both languages 
and to implement the bridges between tools. Once the 
model has been annotated with safety data, it can be 
analyzed using MBSA tools offering one or many methods 
for safety analysis.  
3 www.uml.org/ 
4 http://sysml.org/ 
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MBSA tools fall into three categories: (i) analytical and
simulation tools; (ii) risk management tools; (iii) process 
management tools. Table 1 lists examples of MBSA tools 
and shows their main advantages and limitations. 
Table 1. Comparative analysis of MBSA tools 
Tools Category Advantages Limitations 
xSAP, SAML, 
Figaro toolset, 
AltaRica toolset, 
Hip-Hops, 
FaultTree+, 
CAFTA 
Analytical 
and 
simulation 
tools 
Rich 
functionality 
and profound 
analysis 
provided 
Professional 
knowledge of 
modeling 
methods (e.g., 
Markov chains, 
Petri nets, etc.) 
and formal 
languages like 
AltaRica, Figaro, 
SMV; 
Scalability 
problems; 
Often closed 
data formats 
RiskWatch, 
PILAR 
Risk 
managem
ent tools 
Extensive 
analysis 
provided by 
informal 
description 
methods  
System is never 
explicitly 
modeled; 
Recommendatio
ns given as 
informal design 
templates 
IBM Tivoli 
Availability 
Process 
Manager 
Process 
managem
ent tools 
Connecting 
business and 
system layers 
Information is 
difficult to export 
due to 
proprietary 
formats 
Sophia and 
proposed 
methodology 
Analytical 
tool and 
Risk 
managem
ent tool 
Open data 
formats 
(UML, 
SysML, 
openPSA, 
SMV, 
AltaRica); 
Support of 
both 
analytical and 
description 
methods (like 
FMEA or 
HARA) 
Traceability of 
safety 
artefacts via 
application of 
several 
methods 
Demand certain 
efforts during first  
modeling  
Examples of analytical and simulations tools are xSAP[7], 
SAML [8], Figaro toolset [9], AltaRica toolset 5 , Hip-
Hops[10], FaultTree+6, CAFTA7. Despite rich functionality 
and profound analysis provided by those tools, many of
them require professional knowledge of modeling methods
(e.g., Markov chains, Petri nets, etc.) and formal languages 
like AltaRica, Figaro, SMV, etc. which is a barrier for 
widespread utilization. Among other issues are scalability 
problems (in particular, increasing number of states during 
a static modeling) and closed data formats that makes it 
difficult to reuse and/or export obtained safety models, 
libraries and results. Tools like AltaRica or xSAP require 
reverse engineering to build system models. 
RiskWatch8 or PILAR9 are the tools implementing various 
risk management methodologies. Those tools are
exclusively qualitative, and based on various tabular 
structures filled by informal description methods. The 
running system is never explicitly modeled. All proposed 
recommendations for risk mitigation remain in the area of 
general and informal design templates. 
The process management tools such as IBM Tivoli 
Availability Process Manager10 aim to connect the business
layer with the system layer. Information obtained with those 
tools is difficult to reuse and/or export, as it is based on
proprietary tools/protocols. 
There are also some ongoing initiatives and projects 
working on safety certification platforms (e.g. the European 
5 https://altarica.labri.fr/ 
6 https://www.isograph.com/software/reliability-workbench/ 
7 https://www.controlsdata.com/civil-aero/cafta 
8 http://www.riskwatch.com/ 
9 www.pilar-tools.com/en/tools/pilar/ 
AMASS11 initiative), however there is still a lack of tooled 
aid that would help to cover a complete conformance to 
safety standards. Matlab Simulink supports ISO26262 but it 
is usually used at later stages of development. In the context 
of AUTOSAR and EAST-ADL, [14] proposes a methodology 
for early safety analysis to comply with ISO26262. 
Sophia and the associated methodology provides both an 
analytical and risk management framework that covers all 
stages of development and safety analysis from 
specification to design. It provides a fluent and integrated 
flow with several safety analyses techniques depending on 
the development progress. The design and safety artefacts 
are traced to each other in a coherent manner and defined 
in open data formats that facilitates their usage in external 
tools. The important effort introduces for the deployment of 
the methodology at the first time for a project is rapidly 
amortized during next iterations of the project or other future 
projects thanks to the reusability inherent to a model-based 
approach. 
3. Paper Contribution
We propose a methodology for the design of safety-critical 
automotive systems based on model-based approach. We 
exploit hardware/safety co-engineering to define a 
compositional development methodology compatible with 
ISO26262. This allows obtaining safe-by-design automotive 
systems by coupling development and safety processes. 
Although ISO26262 provides only generic 
recommendations on which safety related work-products 
and results should be issued during the development and 
analysis of automotive safety-critical systems, it does not 
specify the particular processes and how to get those 
results. In order to tackle this limitation, the proposed 
methodology specifies the development and safety analysis 
flows based on recommendations given in ISO26262. There 
may exist dependencies between work-products 
recommended by ISO26262, which can slow down the 
hardware development. Therefore, an innovative and 
efficient way to implement the ISO26262 recommendations 
is to turn to hardware/safety co-engineering and parallelize 
steps of the proposed flows when possible. The advantage 
of such an approach is that safety steps do not block 
hardware development steps, and conversely. 
The methodology is implemented in a modeling framework, 
called Sophia, offering a graphical development 
environment for hardware system design and 
implementation. 
The proposed methodology and framework provide a 
support for safety engineers working in automotive domain 
by formalizing, synchronizing and semi-automating 
hardware development and safety analysis activities 
recommended in ISO26262. 
4. Methodology
The methodology shows how to conduct safety analysis 
from the early steps of hardware (HW) development. 
ISO26262 describes a “reference phase model for the 
product development at the hardware level”.  
The inputs for the proposed methodology are 1) system 
description including requirements, functional and system 
architecture, and 2) safety analysis results from HARA 
(Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment), FTA (Fault Tree 
Analysis), FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), 
obtained at the prior phases of system development life-
cycle such as concept definition and product development 
at the system level. 
In order to harmonize the proposed co-engineering 
methodology with ISO26262, we map its main steps to the 
clauses of the standard as shown in Figure 1. Below the 
10
https://www.ibm.com/software/products/fi/tivoliavailabilityprocessmanag
er 
11 https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/ 
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steps are prefixed with the appropriate clauses from 
ISO26262 (e.g. 5.7.4.1 is corresponding to clause 7.4.1 of 
part 5 of ISO26262). The methodology defines the following 
steps:  
- 5.5 Initiation of product development at the HW level. In
this step, we determine and plan the functional safety
activities to perform during the individual steps of hardware
development.
- 5.6 HW requirements engineering and (synchronized with) 
5.6 HW safety requirements. During these steps, the design 
and safety requirements of the hardware system are
specified and analyzed by hardware engineer and safety
engineer respectively. These two steps refer to the clause 
5.6 of ISO26262.  
- 5.7.4.1 HW architecture design and (synchronized with)
HW system safety analysis. The hardware system
architecture is specified. This architecture is then annotated 
with safety artifacts defining failure modes, its causes and
effects, as well as hardware dysfunctional behavior. Once
the architecture is extended with safety artifacts, the
preliminary hardware system safety analysis is conducted.
This analysis includes such semi-automated methods as
FMEA, FTA and formal safety property verification. If new
hazards are introduced during these steps, HARA must be
also conducted.
Figure 1. Proposed hardware/safety co-engineering methodology. 
- 5.7.4.2 HW detailed design and (synchronized with)
5.7.4.3 HW safety analysis. During the hardware detailed
design, the hardware system is refined into a detailed
design for implementation. This step corresponds to clause
5.7.4.2 of ISO26262. The preliminary safety analysis made
in the previous step is extended during the hardware safety 
analysis according to the detailed specification of the
hardware components. This step refers to clause 5.7.4.3 of
ISO26262. In addition to the semi-automated FMEA, FTA,
and, optionally, HARA, the manual analysis of safe, single- 
and multiple-point faults should be conducted. The later
identifies the safe, single- and multiple-point faults, provides 
the evidence of the effectiveness of safety mechanisms to
avoid residual and latent faults, and gives their diagnostic
coverage.
- 5.7.4.4 Verification of HW design and (synchronized with)
5.7.4.4 Safety Verification of HW design. During these
steps, we verify the hardware design for compliance and
completeness with respect to the requirements, including
the safety requirements. For the latter, verification is
supported by safety analyses. These two steps refer to the
clause 5.7.4.4 of ISO26262.
- 5.8 Evaluation of the hardware architectural metrics and
(synchronized with) 5.9 Evaluation of safety goal violations
due to random HW failures. In these steps, we verify the
architectural metrics and residual risk for compliance with
the ASIL of the safety goals. Using safety analyses, we
evaluate the effectiveness of the architecture of the system
to cope with the random hardware failures as well as the
effectiveness of the dedicated measures defined for
hardware to avoid violations of the safety goals due to
random hardware failures. These steps refer to the clause
5.8 and 5.9 of ISO26262.
- 5.10 HW integration.
The proposed co-engineering methodology allow us to
conduct our hardware development in parallel with safety
analysis with respect to ISO26262. By parallelizing both
concerns in a co-engineering process, the hardware
development steps are not blocked by the safety steps.
5. Safety Engineering ADLs
In our methodology, there is only one Safety Engineering 
concern associated with one stakeholder, the Safety 
Analyst. The ADLs are UML profiles dedicated to the 
following aspects of safety analysis:  
- Safety Requirement Engineering. This ADL describes a
taxonomy of safety requirements compatible with ISO26262 
and proposes an extended list of requirement properties.
- Process Management. This ADL defines evolution of
system architecture through its live-cycle by introducing
such concepts as system feature, function, component,
hardware and software along with corresponding allocation
relationships.
- Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, HARA. This ADL
describes the safety concepts related to HARA from
ISO26262.
- Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, FMEA. This ADL
describes safety concepts related to FMEA, criticality FMEA 
and diagnostic FMEA.
- Fault Tree Analysis, FTA. This ADL describes safety
concepts related to qualitative and quantitative FTA.
- Formal Safety Property Verification. This ADL describes
safety concepts related to system dysfunctional behavior
(Failure State, Failure Event, Failure Transition, etc.) and
property verification expressed in CTL logic. The use of this
ADL allows model translation to SMV language for further
formal analysis with NuSMV tool.
Each profile has its equivalent viewpoint, e.g.
FMEA_Viewpoint, FTA_Viewpoint.
Table 2 gives the mapping between steps defined by our
hardware/safety co-engineering methodology and the
viewpoints of domain-specific ADLs described above. In this 
paper, the mapping focuses on viewpoints because they are 
the main elements in our ADLs that answer the engineering
concerns.
The proposed methodology and ADLs are implemented in
Sophia. It is a Papyrus-based tool for model-based safety
analysis developed in CEA. Sophia provides a single
environment for model-based system and safety
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engineering and includes ADLs and tools for safety 
requirement engineering, process management, HARA, 
FTA (including probabilistic calculations based on FIDES), 
FMEA, formal safety property verification in CTL. 
Table 2. Mapping of the proposed method to domain-
specific ADLs 
Proposed method (Fig. 1) Viewpoint  
HW Dev. Safety 
Analysis 
SysML Sophia ADLs 
5.6 HW 
req. eng. 
SysML 
Require-ment 
diagram  
5.6 HW 
safety req. 
eng. 
Safety Requirement 
Engineering 
Viewpoint 
5.7.4.1 
HW 
architectu
re design 
SysML Block 
definition & 
internal block 
diagrams 
Process 
Management 
Viewpoint: Hardware 
System Design 
5.7.4.1 HW 
system 
safety 
analysis 
HARA, FMEA, 
FTA, Formal safety 
property verification 
Viewpoints 
5.7.4.2 
HW 
detailed 
design 
SysML Block 
definition & 
internal block 
diagrams 
Process 
Management 
Viewpoint: Hardware 
System Design 
5.7.4.3 HW 
safety 
analysis 
HARA, FMEA, 
FTA, Formal safety 
property verification 
Viewpoints 
5.7.4.4 
Verificatio
n of HW 
design 
HARA, FMEA, 
FTA, Formal safety 
property verification 
Viewpoints 
6. Case Study
We demonstrate our proposed approach by applying it on 
an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) System. The ACC is a 
well-known automotive system that allows a vehicle’s cruise 
control to adapt the vehicle’s speed to the traffic 
environment. The driver of the host car with ACC system 
can set the speed and clearance mode. The ACC uses a 
radar attached to the front of the vehicle to detect whether 
preceding vehicle are moving in the path of the host car with 
ACC system. If there are no preceding vehicles, the system 
maintains driver selected speed. When preceding vehicles 
shows up, the system may automatically apply braking, 
control throttle or shift gear to adapt the vehicle speed and 
maintain driver selected clearance without intervention of 
the driver. We get inspired by the ACC system 
specifications defined in [15] to design and analyze the ACC 
system according to the different viewpoints of our 
approach.  
6.1. Safety Requirement Engineering viewpoint. We first 
capture the functional requirements of the ACC system. The 
requirements specify functionalities of the ACC system, so 
they are linked to functional component representing the 
system. In Figure 2 that presents some ACC functional 
requirements in a Requirement diagram, let consider the 
requirement “REQ_ACC_03”. This requirement is satisfied 
by the component “ACC module”, and its refinement in 
several subrequirements REQ_ACC_03a, REQ_ACC_03b, 
REQ_ACC_03c, are satisfied by the system function 
“Increment speed”, “Decrement speed” and “Shift gear” 
respectively.  These requirements are enriched with safety 
requirements developing the counter measures identified as 
we performed the safety analyses of the system.  
6.2. Process Management viewpoint. We use SysML 
diagrams to describe the vehicle feature including the usage 
scenarios, the ACC system architecture, etc. Figure 3 
shows an outline of the ACC system components at a high 
level that we model with a Block Definition Diagram. 
The core part of the ACC system is the ACC module. The 
ACC module processes data information receives from the 
radar component that scans the road and determines the 
speed of the preceding vehicles. The ACC module sends a 
signal to Brake Control module in case of braking need. The 
Engine Control Module and Electronic Throttle Control are 
used to control the vehicle speed by increasing or 
decreasing throttle injection. The cruise switches 
component have several buttons that allow the driver to 
command ACC functionalities and to set selected speed 
and clearance. The Instrument cluster is a panel in front of 
the driver that process the cruise switches and send them 
to the ACC and Engine Control Modules. The instrument 
cluster also display information regarding the ACC system 
state to the driver. The Brake switches component are used 
to deactivate the cruise control operation. The Brake lights 
component allows illumination of the stop lamps during 
automatic braking from the ACC module request. The Brake 
actuators & Speed sensors component embodied the 
sensors and devices such as the brake pedal, the 
accelerator pedal, etc. All the signals between the 
components are transmitted over communication bus, such 
as Controller-Area Network (CAN). Figure 4 shows the 
hardware design of the ACC with the interconnecting 
interfaces between those components, using Internal Block 
Diagram. Those components are trace to the functional 
requirements captured in the Safety Requirements 
viewpoint. Whenever the architectural element are refined, 
they are also trace back to some refined requirements. 
6.3. HARA viewpoint. The Hazard analysis and risk 
assessment is carried out based on the usage scenarios 
and the main functionalities of the system (including its 
architecture and interfaces if available) according to 
ISO26262. Hence, the hazard analysis take into account the 
models defined in the Safety requirements and Process 
management viewpoints.  
The analysis first specifies the dangerous situations by 
determining the operational scenarios that, in combination 
with some environmental, driving and operating conditions 
(for example, driving high speed, ACC engaged, etc.), may 
lead to accidents. An example of operational situation that 
can lead to a dangerous situation is “the ACC system being 
active when the vehicle is driving on highway at medium 
speed, following a preceding vehicle”.  The analysis also 
introduces the malfunctions and associated hazards leading 
to these accidents and establishes the resulting hazardous 
events in relation to the elicited dangerous situations in 
which they can occur.  
Figure 5 shows an excerpt of the HARA table defines for the 
ACC system where each line describe a Hazardous event 
and its related information.  
Let consider the ACC function “Increment speed” to 
maintain desired distance with the preceding vehicle about 
the first two lines in Figure 5. Examples of malfunction that 
can happen with regard to this function is “the ACC system 
increases the vehicle speed when it is too close of the 
preceding vehicle” and “the ACC system increases the 
speed of the vehicle beyond the desired speed set by the 
driver”. The generic hazard “Unintended acceleration” can 
be associated with these malfunctions.  
The resulting hazardous event as defined by ISO26262 are 
combination of the hazard and the operational situation, i.e. 
“ACC module requests an unintended acceleration when 
preceding vehicles are too close”, which situation ended in 
a crash accident with severe to fatal injuries to people 
involved. The hazardous events are automatically classified 
according to an ASIL level based on specified exposure 
level (E) of operational scenarios, controllability (C) of these 
scenarios in the presence of the hazardous events and the 
severity (S) assigned to the resulting accident. In our 
example in Figure 5, our hazardous event is evaluated at 
ASIL C (E=E4, C=C2, S=S3).  
Finally, the analysis allows the determination of safety goals 
for the hazardous events to prevent an unacceptable risk 
level of those events or reduce their impact. These goals 
are meant to be a refinement of the ACC functional 
requirements defined in the Safety Requirement 
Engineering viewpoint. Figure 2 shows few safety 
requirements that refine the ACC functional requirements. 
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Figure 2. Requirement of ACC system 
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Figure 3. Top level architecture of ACC system. 
Hence, for our example of hazardous event, we define the 
following safety goals REQ_ACC_03a: “The ACC system 
should not increase the speed beyond the desired speed 
set by the driver”, and REQ_ACC_03b: “The ACC system 
should decrease the speed when the distance to the 
preceding vehicle is too close”. 
All information participating in the accident scenario are 
defined as model elements that are reusable from one 
viewpoint to another, e.g. the set of operating conditions are
derived from the vehicle and ACC states, the malfunctions
are specified for all functions that satisfied the functional 
requirements of the system. Note that as generic, the 
hazards can be used from a reusable hazard list library. The 
nature of injuries are also coming from a predefined list
corresponding to the injury category described in the ISO 
26262 standard. Sophia environment provides dedicated 
features (diagrams, palette, custom views, etc.) to define 
these artefacts and visualize them in different formats 
(tables, pdf, etc.). Figure 5 shows an excerpt of the HARA
summary table defined for the ACC system, exported in 
excel from the framework. 
6.4. FMEA viewpoint. The FMEA complements the HARA
in order to determine better the correctives actions to 
implement to meet the safety objectives previously defined.
This analysis use as input the usage scenarios, the system
architecture of the system, as well as the results of the 
HARA model elements (accidents, malfunctions, hazardous
events, accidents, etc.) and their properties (severity, asil, 
etc.). The analysis helps determine the effects and criticality 
of single basic causes of failure modes at component level
up till system level and. The FMEA artefacts are traced to 
hazardous events and accidents previously identified in 
HARA analysis. To perform the analysis, our method 
proposes to identify for each component, the different
failures modes that can lead to its loss or unwanted 
behavior. For each failure mode, we must identify the 
effects (at component, system and customer levels) and
their initial and final severity, the causes and their initial 
occurrences, as well as the preventive actions and final 
occurrences. Sophia environment offers automatic safety 
annotations of system components, modelling of FMEA 
artefacts (causes, effects, preventive actions), criticality 
analysis, generation and display of FME(C)A tables within 
the model, and visualization of results in different formats 
(table, pdf, excel, etc.).
Figure 6 shows the FMECA table defines for the ACC 
system where the different Failure modes and associated 
artefacts are traced to its components. We identify different 
failure modes as over speed, under speed, loss of braking, 
unexpected braking, etc. The causes of the failure modes 
range from external to software and hardware related. 
Example of such causes are missing input signal, 
communication bus fault, delayed operation of the signal, 
no current to actuators, incorrect data received from radar, 
etc. The failure modes can lead to different effects until the 
crash of the vehicle at customer level that correspond/trace 
to the accident identified in HARA. Some preventive actions 
are elicited to either avoid the failure modes apparition, or 
reduce severity of its effects, e.g. a system architecture 
modification to not allow cruise activation or to deactivate 
cruise mode when the braking system is on failure.  The 
preventive actions can also be as simple as warning 
implementation as e.g. display information to the driver on 
the panel about the failure mode. The preventive actions are 
turned into safety requirements to make the hardware 
design safer. These new set of safety requirements are 
trace to the safety goals elicited during HARA. 
6.5. FTA viewpoint. The FTA analyzes the propagation 
within the architecture of identified failures modes. The 
analysis allow probability calculations of the basic feared 
events and the resulting minimal cut sets that can lead to 
accidents. The goal is to identify and prevent the multiple 
failure points. Specifically, a top event is analyzed at the 
component level by combining a series of lower-level events 
using Boolean logic. The FTA module of Sophia 
environment allows the automatic annotation of models with 
safety properties and the definition of reliability expressions 
at the ports of the component units of the system 
architecture. This annotation makes it possible the 
generation of the fault trees and to define different 
qualitative and quantitative analyzes of the architecture. 
The results of these analyzed are exported in different files. 
A visualization of FT trees is also provided.  
7. Conclusion and Further Work
We present the methodology and framework for coupling 
model-based system engineering, safety analysis at the 
early phases of development life-cycle of automotive 
systems. The methodology aims to fill the gap between 
system modeling and safety assessment activities by 
formalizing, synchronizing and semi-automating hardware 
development and safety analysis activities recommended in 
ISO26262. 
The proposed methodology is implemented in the modeling 
platform which supports a common system model for 
system and safety engineers, by using UML profile 
mechanisms in Papyrus. This allows integration of all 
artefacts related to safety analysis in the same system 
model, interface customization, highlighting different results 
within one modeling environment and reuse this information 
for further reliability studies.  
We study an example of the Adaptive Cruise Control system 
to illustrate our approach. We model a hardware 
architecture of the system and then apply our methodology 
to illustrate its applicability and effectiveness to support 
system and safety co-engineering with regard to ISO26262.  
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Figure 4. Internal structure of ACC system. 
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Figure 6. Excerpt of FMECA results for ACC system Figure 5. Excerpt of HARA results for ACC system.
                 Communication 4E-1 /1 page 8/9
21e Congrès de Maîtrise des Risques et Sûreté de Fonctionnement λµ21     Reims 16-18 octobre 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The obtained results helps us to identify critical components 
of the Adaptive Cruise Control system and to propose 
changes in the architecture to reduce its overall criticality 
level. 
As further activities, we want to provide a graphical 
monitoring support of the ISO26262 standard to assess 
progress in achieving its recommendations and produced 
the required work products. As such, we are working on an 
automatic translation of textual parts of ISO26262 to the 
formal process description language BPMN (Business 
Process Modeling Notation) that includes also guidance 
with cheat sheets. The model of the standard integrates our
methodology and it is linked with the tool support. This will 
allow to link each step of development and safety 
engineering process with the ISO26262 recommendations 
from one side and issued safety artefacts from another side. 
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